A NIS Directive compliant Cybersecurity Maturity Model by Drivas, George et al.
A NIS Directive compliant Cybersecurity Maturity Assessment Framework
George Drivas
Department of Digital Systems
University of Piraeus
Piraeus, Greece &
National Cyber Security Authority of Greece
Argyro Chatzopoulou
APIROPLUS Solutions
Limassol, Cyprus
Leandros Maglaras
Faculty of Computing, Engineering and Media
De Montfort University &
National Cyber Security Authority of Greece
Costas Lambrinoudakis
Department of Digital Systems
University of Piraeus
Piraeus, Greece
Allan Cook
and Helge Janicke
Faculty of Computing, Engineering and Media
De Montfort University
Abstract—The EU NIS Directive introduces obligations related
to the security of the network and information systems for Op-
erators of Essential Services and for Digital Service Providers.
Moreover, National Competent Authorities for cybersecurity
are required to assess compliance with these obligations. This
paper describes a novel Cybersecurity Maturity Assessment
Framework (CMAF) that is tailored to the NIS Directive
requirements. CMAF can be used either as a self-assessment
tool from Operators of Essential Services and Digital Service
Providers or as an audit tool from the National Competent
Authorities for cybersecurity.
1. Introduction
Cyber attacks could contribute towards the collapse of a
state if they initiate or prolong the failure of Critical National
Infrastructures (CNI). Nations are becoming reliant on the
cyber domain to provide services that keep a nation running:
power grids, water supplies, communications, transportation,
and finance are all increasingly becoming cyber dependant.
The NIS Directive (Directive (EU) 2016/1148) (Euro-
pean Union, 2016) has certain obligations that each mem-
ber state should follow, with a major goal of enhancing
cybersecurity posture across the EU. Having to cope with
the obligations of the NIS Directive and to meet strict
deadlines, Greece has taken some steps forward [1]. The
directive and a relevant national Law (Greek National Law
4577/2018)(Greek Government, 2018) introduce obligations
for the security of the network and information systems
of Operators Of Essential Services (OES) and the security
of the network and information systems of Digital Service
Providers (DSP) and require from the National Competent
Authorities (NCA) to assess the compliance of OES and
DSP with these obligations.
More specifically, the Greek National Law 4577/2018
(Greek Government, 2018) states that “the National Cyber
Security Authority (NCSA), acting as the NCA for cyberse-
curity, in collaboration with the relevant CSIRTs and other
organizations and entities, as appropriate, assesses the tech-
nical and organizational measures implemented by OES, in
order to manage risks related to the security of network and
information systems used in their activities, regarding their
suitability and their proportionality”. Additionally, NCSA
“assesses the suitability of the measures implemented by
DSP for the avoidance and the minimization of the impact of
incidents affecting the security of network and information
systems used for the provision of the basic services, aiming
to assure their business continuity”.
Moreover, the objectives of the NCA across the EU
reach further than just the collection of evidence sent by the
assessed entities and include the vision to reach a common
level of cybersecurity posture. In order to effectively meet
this vision, an initial step for NCSA was to conduct an
assessment of the current cybersecurity posture of public
sectors’ main ICT services, using a structured questionnaire.
This assessment revealed inconsistencies and major mis-
alignment among different entities [2]. As a result, some
additional targets are proposed below:
• Standardization of the collected feedback
• Assignment of a specific level of security, based in
the implemented controls per category
• Analysis of the outputs and extraction of relevant
statistical information regarding the level achieved
per industry, category, and service
• Implementation of comparisons between subsequent
assessments, in order to monitor progress
• Extraction of possible correlations or contrasts be-
tween the information security posture among stake-
holders
• Conduction of further analysis and definition of best
practices
The minimum security requirements that OES and DSP
have to comply with, have been defined in Decision 1027
published in 3739, B, 08.10.2019 Official Gazette of the
Greek Government (Greek Government, 2019). This set of
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requirements, covering areas like Risk Management, Access
Control, Physical and Environmental Controls etc, is based
on a higher-level approach and does not provide any guid-
ance regarding the implementation of these requirements.
For example, for the area of physical and environmental
security, the requirement is that the installations of data cen-
ters and information processing facilities shall be protected
against physical or environmental risk through suitable and
relevant policies and measures based on a risk management
strategy (Greek Government, 2019). This requirement, al-
though mandated by the fact that the relevant entities may
have a great diversity in terms of business operation, size,
security posture, and technical and organizational capability,
is difficult to be monitored effectively by the NCA in order
to achieve the objectives mentioned above.
What was needed in order to facilitate the fulfillment of
the NCSA’s security requirements, especially the measurable
ones, was a tool to standardize the possible maturity levels
of the organizations. For this purpose a specific assessment
framework, the Cybersecurity Maturity Assessment Frame-
work (CMAF), was designed and tested for implementation.
The CMAF could help identify the strengths and weaknesses
of an organization’s processes and examine how compatible
these processes are to related identified best practices or
guidelines.
The assessment framework consists of the security re-
quirements against which the organization’s processes are
appraised and the scale, based on which the rating of com-
pliance of the organization’s processes is evaluated. Based
on the proposed targets mentioned above the assessment
framework should incorporate the following characteristics:
• Cover the full extent of the security requirements
complying to the NIS Directive obligations
• Be able to be used as a self-assessment tool
• Be able to be used as a basis for an external audit
• Provide clear results regarding the security posture
of the organizations
• Be able to be used as a benchmarking tool per
industry, type of organization and area of operation
• Be able to be used as a guide for security require-
ments implementation by the organizations
• Be measurable
• Be easily extractable
2. Related Work
Rea-Guaman et al [3] describe a cybersecurity capability
maturity model as a means by which an organisation can
assess its current level of maturity of its practices. They
provide a comparative study of cybersecurity capability
maturity models that builds on a previous review [4]. The
research presents an assessment of the differences, advan-
tages and disadvantages of a systematic review of published
studies from 2012 to 2017. The method was based on a
modified taxonomy of software improvement environments
across five categories proposed by Halvorson and Conradi
[5]:
1) General: The broad attributes of the improvement
environment.
2) Process: Describing how the environment is used.
3) Organisation: The features that articulate the rela-
tionship between the organisation and the environ-
ment in which it is used.
4) Quality: The indicators used to determine quality
in the environment.
5) Result: A statement of the required outcomes, asso-
ciated costs, and the methods used for evaluation.
Rea-Guaman et al [4] reduce the categories to three,
arguing that quality and result do not support the comparison
of cybersecurity capability maturity models.
The research considers the Systems Security Engineer-
ing Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), Cybersecurity
Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) [6], Community Cyber
Security Maturity Model (CCSMM) [7], National Initiative
for Cybersecurity Education – Capability Maturity Model
(NICE) [8].
The analysis concludes that all four models require a
degree of customization and that SSE-CMM is the most
established of those reviewed. The paper assessed C2M2 as
the only model focused on cybersecurity. It went on to state
that C2M2 and CCSMM are designed to be implemented
in conjunction with the NIST framework and that recent
updates to the models had not been identified. It further
concluded that only SSE-CMM and C2M2 provided detailed
considerations of risk. The research did not present a model
to address the issues identified within those reviewed.
Sabillon [9] reviews the best practices and methodolo-
gies in cybersecurity assurance and audit and presents the
Cyber Security Audit Model (CSAM) for use by orga-
nizations and nation-states to validate audit, preventative,
forensic and detective controls. CSAM comprises 18 do-
mains, with one limited to nation-states and the remaining
17 applicable to organisations in general. All domains have
at least one sub-domain, controls, checklists, sub-controls,
and scorecard. The authors compare CSAM to the NIST
Cyber Security Framework (CSF) version 1.1 and the Audit
First Methodology [10], highlighting the differences. The
work describes the CSAM model and states it was tested,
implemented and validated in a Canadian higher education
institution, although no results are presented, and its efficacy
is not evidenced.
The research does not indicate whether CSAM requires
specific expertise for its use, or whether self-assessment is
feasible. Neither does it present whether the model provides
any actionable outcomes following its use.
Akinsanya [11] performed a literature review of cyber
security models for healthcare organizations adopting cloud
computing. The analysis considers the following:
• Information Security Focus Area Maturity Model
(ISFAM) [12]
• Cloud Security Capability Maturity Model
(CSCMM)
• UK National Health Service (NHS) National Infras-
tructure Maturity Model (NIMM) [13]
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• Health Information Network (HIN) Capability Ma-
turity Model
The researchers concluded that maturity models provide
a compliance model that could not support the complexity of
the emerging cyber environment, particularly for healthcare
organizations adopting cloud technologies. The conclusions
highlight three specific areas of concern and requirements
for further work:
• Cyber security maturity models should focus on
more than standards compliance.
• Any new measures of maturity introduced should
be provided with adequate metrics to make them
meaningful.
• The model should be extensible to accommodate the
dynamic nature of the cyber security threat land-
scape.
The research focuses specifically on healthcare and the
adoption of cloud computing and does not consider adoption
beyond this industry or technology.
Miron and Muita [14] examine cybersecurity maturity
models to identify the standards and controls available to
providers of Critical National Infrastructures (CNI). The
research considers the cyber threats to CNI and the impact of
a loss of such services. The authors document nine cyber-
security capability maturity models assessed as applicable
to CNI. These are presented based on their applicability
to either specific CNI sub-sectors or their general cyber
security focus. The review concludes that, of the models
considered, none are designed to address the scenario of a
CNI operator with a multiplicity of interdependent systems.
Instead, the authors propose that the models are described
at a high level and focus on CNI or industry sub-sectors
and present the need for a model to support municipal
governments.
Adler [15] states that capability maturity models are
inherently static and diagnostic, in that they identify maturity
gaps but are not directly actionable. The research proposes
a methodology that follows three stages:
1) Model: Captures the organization’s current-state cy-
bersecurity maturity levels, formulates a maturity
improvement plan, and identifies influences factors
that will shape the organization’s cybersecurity pos-
ture.
2) Simulate: Produces dynamic simulations of scenar-
ios to determine how particular cybersecurity situa-
tions could evolve within the organization, potential
interventions, and likely outcomes and impacts.
3) Analyze: Assesses the projected mitigation costs
and risk reduction benefits, comparing outcomes
across alternate plans and scenarios.
The stages are illustrated through an analysis based
upon extension to the Electric Sub-sector Cybersecurity
Capability Maturity Model (ES-C2M2) [16]. ES-C2M2 is
a lightweight adaptation of the Resilience Maturity Model
[17]. This extension describes that the requirement for any
process improvement elements within the maturity model
should provide explicit guidance for improving performance
levels towards a desired end-state.
Le and Hoang in [18] investigate existing cybersecurity
maturity models to examine their strengths and weaknesses.
They provide a comparison of 12 models mapped against
five levels of maturity proposed by Humphrey (1989), con-
cluding that models require relevant quantitative metrics for
measurable and actionable assessment. No examples of such
metrics are provided.
Almuhammadi and Alsaleh in [19] review the NIST
Cyber Security Framework (CSF) for critical infrastructures
in order to assess how it can be applied to cybersecurity
maturity models and to determine if any gaps exist. The
authors propose that one of the key benefits of a cybersecu-
rity capability maturity model is that it provides a structure
to allow stakeholders to reach a consensus and set agreed
priorities. The authors state that the NIST CSF does not
provide organizations with a mechanism to measure the
progress of a NIST implementation, or the maturity levels
and information security processes’ capabilities. They assess
that the framework focuses on high-level information secu-
rity requirements and is applicable for the development of
information security programmes and policies. They contrast
this to other frameworks such as COBIT, ISO 27001, and
the ISF Standard of Good Practice (SoGP) for Information
Security. They argue that these focus on information se-
curity technical and functional controls, and that they are
applicable for developing checklists and conducting com-
pliance/audit assessments. The research proposes an infor-
mation security maturity model that is able to measure the
implementation progress of a security programme over time
and assesses the reliability of the IT services that underpin a
business. No examples of such measures are provided, and
no experimental data is presented.
3. Design of the framework
In order to design the CMAF, a combination of literature
review regarding security requirements and a review of
existing frameworks (related to cybersecurity or other well-
established areas) was conducted. At the time of this review
there was only a limited number of established frameworks
in the field, although during the past months, some more
have been introduced. The literature review regarding secu-
rity requirements included 16 basic documents. These doc-
uments were published by organizations like ENISA, ISO,
CIS, European Union, NIST, ISACA and others. The review
regarding existing frameworks included frameworks or mod-
els from organizations like CMMI, CIS, ENISA, Department
of Homeland Security – USA, Citigroup, U.S.Department of
Energy and others.
The main aim while designing the CMAF was to be
compliant with the scope of the NIS Directive, while fol-
lowing a risk-based approach. Meanwhile, effort was given
to integrate scalability, in order to easily adapt to future
requirements, to introduce a metric scale, facilitating bench-
marking and improvement planning, and finally to integrate
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cybersecurity economics aspects, for achieving cost effi-
ciency. Therefore, the proposed framework consists of 20
baseline security requirements, used as a point of reference,
and 6 maturity levels, used as a qualitative metric scale.
3.1. Baseline security requirements
The basis of the CMAF and thus the requirements of
the framework, are those that have been published under
the section “Common Security Policy and Baseline Se-
curity Requirements”, in Ministerial Decree 1027 - 3739,
B, 08.10.2019 Official Gazette of the Greek Government
(Greek Government, 2019). These requirements are grouped
under 3 main categories:
A. IDENTIFICATION: Requirements that are necessary
for the the analysis of the business/operational ecosystem of
the organization, the assets that support its essential services
and the risks related to the security of network and infor-
mation systems. These requirements allow the organization
to focus its efforts and manage its assets effectively and
efficiently.
B. PROTECTION: Requirements that are necessary to
protect all assets (people, procedures and technologies) that
support the essential services of the organization. The se-
lected controls for this category should take into account
the Risk Management Strategy.
C. REACTION: Requirements that are necessary to de-
tect, respond and manage an information security incident
that may jeopardize the provision of the essential services
of the organization. The selected controls for this category
should focus on the minimization of the impact of an
information security incident, by ensuring the continuity and
the recovery of the essential services to an acceptable and
predefined level.
Based on these categories the structure of the framework
is further divided into 20 baseline security requirements:
• A. IDENTIFICATION
Requirement A1: Business Environment
Requirement A2: Asset Management
Requirement A3: Risk Assessment
Requirement A4: Risk Management Strategy
Requirement A5: Supply Chain Risk Management
Requirement A6: Self-Assessment – Improvement
• B. PROTECTION
Requirement B7: Policies, Processes and Procedures
for the protection of essential services.
– Sub-Requirement B7.1: Information Security
Policy, Processes and Procedures
– Sub-Requirement B7.2: Communication and
acceptance
Requirement B8: Identity Management and Access
Control
– Sub-Requirement B8.1: Asset Management
– Sub-Requirement B8.2: Access control for
privileged accounts
– Sub-Requirement B8.3: Management of
equipment for administrative purposes
– Sub-Requirement B8.4: Access Control
– Sub-Requirement B8.5: Authentication
mechanisms
Requirement B9: Physical and Environmental secu-
rity
Requirement B10: Systems and Applications secu-
rity
– Sub-Requirement B10.1: Systems Security
– Sub-Requirement B10.2: Application Secu-
rity
– Sub-Requirement B10.3: Security in Applica-
tion Development
Requirement B11: Data Security
– Sub-Requirement B11.1: Encryption
– Sub-Requirement B11.2: Data Classification
Requirement B12: Backups
Requirement B13: Security Technologies
– Sub-Requirement B13.1: Traffic filtering
– Sub-Requirement B13.2: Segregation of sys-
tems
– Sub-Requirement B13.3: Malware protection
Requirement B14: Systems Testing
– Sub-Requirement B14.1: Security Assess-
ments
– Sub-Requirement B14.2: Compliance Check-
ing
Requirement B15: Change Management
Requirement B16: Awareness and Training
• C. REACTION
Requirement C17: Threat Detection
Requirement C18: Incident Management
Requirement C19: Business Continuity
Requirement C20: Disaster Recovery
For each of these requirements the applicable controls
have been recognized, analyzed and assigned to the ap-
propriate maturity level, as described in the maturity scale
below.
3.2. The maturity scale
After the review of the existing frameworks, it was de-
cided that the CMAF would be based in a 6-levels maturity
scale:
• Maturity Level 5: Efficient - Optimized
The organization has implemented methods for the
continuous improvement of the implemented con-
trols and the security posture of the organization.
A full risk-based approach is followed and a cost-
benefit balance is applied. The necessary controls
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Figure 1. Maturity level representation: For each level of the maturity scale, a different seal was selected. Each seal represents a series of concentric cycles.
The color of each cycle has been selected from the PH scale – red being the lowest and blue being the highest.
are implemented, measured, and controlled at the
described level.
• Maturity Level 4: Effective - Quantitatively Man-
aged
The organization has set specific objectives. The
objectives (were possible S.M.A.R.T. compliant) are
being monitored, measured, analyzed, and evaluated.
The necessary controls are implemented, measured
and controlled at the described level.
• Maturity Level 3: Advanced - Defined
There is a standardized method regarding the ful-
fillment of the requirement. The necessary controls
are implemented, measured, and controlled at the
described level.
• Maturity Level 2: Basic - Managed
There is a concrete plan regarding the fulfillment
of the requirement. The necessary controls are im-
plemented but are partially measured and partially
controlled.
• Maturity Level 1: Initial - Reactive
The organization has started implementing the re-
quirement, but the extent of the implementation is
partial or reactive.
• Maturity Level 0: Incomplete - Not existing
The requirement under examination is not imple-
mented or it is implemented only partially or ad hoc.
For each level of the maturity scale, a different seal was
selected. Each seal represents a series of concentric cycles.
The lowest possible score is represented by a one cycle seal
and the highest by a six cycle seal. The color of each cycle
has been selected from the PH scale – red being the lowest
and blue the highest (Figure 1).
4. Framework validation
Since the framework was primarily based on literature
review, it was decided that, before its release, it should be
validated through an implementation pilot project. The pilot
project should include organizations from different sectors,
of different sizes and with different security postures. To
achieve this, the following diverse pilots were selected for
validation purposes:
• A mid-sized OES from the healthcare sector, that is
expected to have a low level of maturity
• A mid-sized OES from the Digital Infrastructures
sector, that is expected to have a medium level of
maturity
• A large-sized OES from the air-transport sector, that
is expected to have a high level of maturity
The pilot assessments were carried out by a team of
experts consisting of: One expert, already involved in the
development of the CMAF with a deep knowledge of the
framework itself and with high auditing skills on security
controls, and two experts from the NCSA, tasked with the
monitoring of the framework implementation process and
the review of the related outcomes.
The assessments were carried out via the following
methods: Table-top assessments, interviews, and on-site vis-
its. In Figure 2 the graphical representation of the assess-
ment result of a fictitious organization, that is produced from
the CMAF implementation, is presented.
The results of the assessments and the proposed im-
provements during the pilot project were gathered, ana-
lyzed, and incorporated in the final version of the model.
Following that, an evaluation of the pilot project revealed
that the CMAF was initially able to demonstrate: A holistic
higher-level overview of cybersecurity, compatibility with
industry-specific security controls, adaptability to diverse
and complex environments, industry neutrality and ease of
application.
5. Discussion
The National Competent Authorities for cybersecurity,
especially those who need to comply with the NIS Directive,
could use the proposed maturity assessment framework in
order to request from the applicable organizations the imple-
mentation of self-assessments based on the framework and
collect the results. The authorities can review the collected
responses, analyze the data, and produce valuable conclu-
sions. Also, comments regarding possible improvements can
be collected from the applicable organizations as well as
from the dedicated staff dealing with the assessment of the
results.
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Figure 2. Graphical representation of the cybersecurity maturity assessment
result per requirement
An extended version of the CMAF could integrate other
industry-specific models or incorporate specific require-
ments, such as for cloud services and OT/ IoT environments.
Based on the findings from the cybersecurity assessments,
additional cyber security controls may be introduced related
to legal, technical, organizational, capacity building, and
cooperation aspects.
6. Conclusions
As Critical National Infrastructures are becoming more
vulnerable to cyber attacks, their protection becomes a
significant issue for any organization, as well as a nation-
state. Cybersecurity for CNI essential services often follows
a lifecycle model of identification, protection, detection, and
reaction. Moreover, an assessment is an activity that helps
identify the strengths and weaknesses of an organization’s
processes and examine how closely these processes relate to
identified best practices and guidelines. In order to help in
the evaluation of the cybersecurity posture of CNI, a novel
cybersecurity maturity assessment framework, the CMAF,
is presented in this paper. The proposed framework consists
of 20 security requirements, 6 maturity levels and can be
used both as a self-assessment tool and as an external audit
tool. Furthermore, it facilitates organizations to perform a
gap analysis and receive a graphical representation of their
security posture. Information collected from the framework
can be used from National Competent Authorities, after
proper aggregation and anonymization processes, in order
to identify common security gaps and thereafter to prioritize
future security programmes and funding initiatives on a
national or European level.
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